En este ar tícu lo los au to res se pro po nen ex plo rar di ver sos re tos que enfren tan los teó ri cos ana lí ti cos del de re cho con tem po rá neos, los cua les han acep ta do que una pers pec ti va es ta tis ta del sis te ma ju rí di co y de la le ga li dad -in tro du ci da por H. L. A. Hart-es fun da men tal como pun to de par ti da en la teo ría. Los au to res sos tie nen que este en fo que con tie ne pro ble mas ex pli ca ti vos in ter nos que li mi tan su ca pa ci dad para ex pli car fe nó me nos ju rí di cos pri ma fa cie no ve do sos que no se ajus tan a la ex perien cia pa ra dig má ti ca de un de re cho-es ta do. Los au to res re for mu lan el en fo que ana lí ti co me dian te la in tro duc ción de las ba ses de lo que de nomi nan una "teo ría de la le ga li dad in ter-ins ti tu cio nal", esto es, una teo ría de la le ga li dad de ri va da de una no ción mo ral men te neu tral, des crip ti va y ex pli ca ti va del sis te ma ju rí di co como un sis te ma de ins ti tu cio nes ju rí dicas. Esta teo ría per mi te, ade más, ex pli car los fe nó me nos ju rí di cos pri ma fa cie no ve do sos que iden ti fi can los au to res; y con cluir que si bien los enfo ques an te rio res ha cia el sis te ma ju rí di co y la le ga li dad de los teó ri cos ana lí ti cos es tu vie ron his tó ri ca men te en lo co rrec to al to mar como pun to de par ti da el ejem plo de un sis te ma ju rí di co mu ni ci pal, ese ejem plo y pun to de par ti da han de ja do de ser re le van tes, di cho ejem plo y pun to de par ti da no re sul ta su fi cien te, por lo que la ex pli ca ción de la le ga li dad den tro de los con fi nes del Esta do no es su fi cien te para una ex pli ca ción ge ne ral de la le ga li dad. Analytical le gal the ory has long taken as its cen tral fo cus the ex pe ri ence of the law-state, and the suc cess of an a lyt ical the o ries of law has been mea sured by their abil ity to ex plain the phe nom e non of the law-state. Yet this fo cus and con cep tion of suc cess may be forced to change as the place of the law-state in our ex pe ri ence of law is chang ing -from the United King dom's de vo lu tion of power to Scotland, to the Eu ro pean Un ion's con sid er ation of a shared con sti tu tion, and the rise of su pra-na tional le gal in sti tutions such as the In ter na tional Crim i nal Court. The goal of this ar ti cle is to show that an a lyt i cal le gal the ory faces insur mount able ex plan a tory prob lems which pre vent it from re spond ing ad e quately to the the o ret i cal chal lenges posed by the flour ish ing of novel forms of le gal or der, and to provide the ba sis of an ad e quate the o ret i cal re sponse to those novel phe nom ena while re main ing within at least some of the com mit ments and vir tues of the an a lyt i cal ap proach. As we de velop our ar gu ment we do not pro pose to ad vance ev idence from ev ery pur ported in stance of le gal ity out side conven tional law-states. Nor do we pro pose to en coun ter ev ery vari ant of an a lyt i cal the ory. We aim to iden tify sev eral cat ego ries of prima fa cie le gal phe nom ena de serv ing ex pla na tion and in clu sion or re jec tion by an a lyt i cal the o ries of law as le gal phe nom ena, and to sup ply a par tic u lar line of ar gument against the ca pac ity of both the dom i nant his tor i cal ar gu ments and novel vari ants to ac count for those phe nomena. We of fer a rem edy to the short com ings of an a lyt i cal legal the ory in the form of an inter-in sti tu tional the ory of legal ity which de vel ops an ac count of le gal or der from as sess ment of in ten sity of mu tual ref er ence among so cial in sti tu tions whose sta tus as le gal in sti tu tions is dem onstrated by their use of func tion ally-re lated fam i lies of pe -
Analytical le gal the ory has long taken as its cen tral fo cus the ex pe ri ence of the law-state, and the suc cess of an a lyt ical the o ries of law has been mea sured by their abil ity to ex plain the phe nom e non of the law-state. Yet this fo cus and con cep tion of suc cess may be forced to change as the place of the law-state in our ex pe ri ence of law is chang ing -from the United King dom's de vo lu tion of power to Scotland, to the Eu ro pean Un ion's con sid er ation of a shared con sti tu tion, and the rise of su pra-na tional le gal in sti tutions such as the In ter na tional Crim i nal Court. The goal of this ar ti cle is to show that an a lyt i cal le gal the ory faces insur mount able ex plan a tory prob lems which pre vent it from re spond ing ad e quately to the the o ret i cal chal lenges posed by the flour ish ing of novel forms of le gal or der, and to provide the ba sis of an ad e quate the o ret i cal re sponse to those novel phe nom ena while re main ing within at least some of the com mit ments and vir tues of the an a lyt i cal ap proach. As we de velop our ar gu ment we do not pro pose to ad vance ev idence from ev ery pur ported in stance of le gal ity out side conven tional law-states. Nor do we pro pose to en coun ter ev ery vari ant of an a lyt i cal the ory. We aim to iden tify sev eral cat ego ries of prima fa cie le gal phe nom ena de serv ing ex pla na tion and in clu sion or re jec tion by an a lyt i cal the o ries of law as le gal phe nom ena, and to sup ply a par tic u lar line of ar gument against the ca pac ity of both the dom i nant his tor i cal ar gu ments and novel vari ants to ac count for those phe nomena. We of fer a rem edy to the short com ings of an a lyt i cal legal the ory in the form of an inter-in sti tu tional the ory of legal ity which de vel ops an ac count of le gal or der from as sess ment of in ten sity of mu tual ref er ence among so cial in sti tu tions whose sta tus as le gal in sti tu tions is dem onstrated by their use of func tion ally-re lated fam i lies of pe -remp tory, con tent-in de pend ent norms. Our ar gu ment is inten tion ally ges tural and non-com pre hen sive as we are tack ling a large prob lem in only a lit tle space. 1 The merit of our pa per lies, then, in the bal ance be tween our crit i cisms of pre vail ing an a lyt i cal ap proaches, and the plau si bil ity of the al ter na tive we be gin to build here. The or ga ni za tion of our ar gu ment fol lows our mo ti va tion. Since we aim ul ti mately to con tend that novel phe nom ena pres ent an un an swer able chal lenge to dom i nant an a lyt i cal ap proaches to char ac ter iza tion of le gal ity, our first step is to dis play the phe nom ena. Next, we elab o rate the rea sons why the in flu en tial ap proach de part ing from the work of H. L. A. Hart can not face these phe nom ena. Fi nally, we pres ent the ru di ments of our inter-in sti tu tional the ory of le gal ity.
NEW PHENOMENA
In what fol lows we pres ent prima fa cie le gal phe nom ena un der four ad mit tedly pro vi sional cat e go ries which rely for their util ity on their con ven tional mean ing within law, po liti cal sci ence, and le gal the ory. We iden tify and dis cuss: intra-state le gal ity, trans-state le gal ity, su pra-state le gal ity and super-state le gal ity, cap tur ing a range of norms and nor ma tive or ders of ten spo ken of as in ter na tional law. It should be em pha sized again that while we write here of these phe nom ena as ex hib it ing "le gal ity", we do so only sug ges tively, as part of our con ten tion that they ex em plify so cial phe nom ena which pose a se ri ous chal lenge to the explanatory adequacy of contemporary analytical legal theory.
Intra-State Le gal ity
Per haps the most in tu itively chal leng ing in stances of prima fa cie le gal ity are found within the law-state, yet none -88 CULVER / GIUDICE the less ap pear to be mean ing fully in de pend ent of the lawstate and so de serve rec og ni tion as 'intra-state' forms of legal ity. Far from the rel a tively fa mil iar con text of non-state le gal ity in the emer gence of in ter na tional law out of the agree ments of states, intra-state le gal ity is sys temic in ways some times char ac ter ized as ar range ments of di vided sov ereignty, where sov er eignty is in ter nally shared yet ex ter nally united in for eign af fairs, treaty-mak ing, and other ac tiv i ties. Other forms of sov er eignty-shar ing may ex tend be yond concep tions of di vided sov er eignty into new orders in which legal orders do not abut but overlap one another.
Dis trib uted gov er nance ar range ments are likely the most fa mil iar intra-state de vices for cre ation of what are sometimes re garded as sub sys tems of law, a re lin quish ing of cen tral ized gov er nance au thor ity which none the less stops short of di vi sion of sov er eignty. In these ar range ments histor i cally core le gal in sti tu tions dis trib ute their au thor ity to rel a tively dis tant le gal in sti tu tions within the sys tem, whether re formed ex tant in sti tu tions or new in sti tu tions. Typ i cally this dis tri bu tion is un der taken to lo cate de cision-mak ing within in sti tu tions best suited to mak ing partic u lar de ci sions -whether geo graph i cally or experientially or fi nan cially or in some other way best suited. Shared gover nance is a less fa mil iar, yet in creas ingly ev i dent form of gov er nance within the law-state in volv ing col lab o ra tion between tra di tion ally or his tor i cally cen tral le gal in sti tu tions and other so cial or ga ni za tions of vary ing com plex ity and institutionalization, con trib ut ing in var i ous plainly ev i dent ways to for ma tion and vari a tion of le gal norms. From shared gov er nance we may now be mov ing to over lap ping, rel a tively in de pend ent legal orders of a new form-perhaps in spite of insistence to the contrary on the part of the central agents in these new orders.
In Can ada, for ex am ple, fed eral and pro vin cial gov ernments face com plex gov er nance tasks with re spect to in dige nous 'First Na tions' peo ples, sev eral of whom are still in the pro cess of ne go ti at ing land claims trea ties, de ny ing Can ada's au thor ity and act ing in a fash ion sim i lar to sov ereign states while for the most part re main ing de facto within the au thor ity of the Ca na dian law-state. The jus tice of First Na tions claims and the af ter math of co lo nial practices has left fed eral and pro vin cial gov ern ments very sen sitive to the com plex ity of gov er nance of re lated is sues. One re sult has been the ne go ti a tion of meth ods of mu tual re lation be tween Gov ern ment of Can ada and First Na tions author i ties re gard ing mat ters such as tax a tion. The na ture of this re la tion is com plex, yet what ever fi nal anal y sis re veals, it is worth con sid er ing the pos si bil ity that new forms of legal or der are be ing forged. The Gov ern ment of Can ada it self ac knowl edges in the terms of its an nounce ment in the Canada Ga zette that the First Na tions Tax Com mis sion is "a shared gov er nance or ga ni za tion which re quires that appoint ments to the gov ern ing body be made by both the Govern ment of Can ada and at least one other gov ern ment or or ga ni za tion". Spe cif i cally, the FNTC was cre ated to -As sume au thor ity for the ap proval of First Na tion prop erty tax laws made under the Act; -Pro vide pro fes sional and ob jec tive as sess ments of First Na tion prop erty tax ation un der the Act; -Pre vent and min i mize the costs of dis putes by pro vid ing a mech a nism for hear ing the con cerns of af fected par ties un der the Act and for pro mot ing the rec oncil i a tion of the in ter ests of First Na tions and tax pay ers; -Set stan dard ized ad min is tra tive prac tices for First Na tion real prop erty tax ad min is tra tions cre ated un der the Act and pro vide train ing to en sure stan dards are achieved; -Pro vide ed u ca tion in or der to raise aware ness of the ben e fits of First Na tion tax a tion be tween First Na tions and the rest of the coun try; and -Ad vise the Min is ter on pol icy is sues re lat ing to the im ple men ta tion of First Na tion prop erty tax a tion pow ers and on any mat ter or pol icy put to it by the Min ister.
The FNTC is a shared gov er nance or ga ni za tion which re quires that ap pointments to the gov ern ing body be made by both the Gov ern ment of Can ada and at least one other gov ern ment or or ga ni za tion. In the case of the FNTC, nine com mission ers are se lected by the Gov er nor in Coun cil on be half of the Gov ern ment of Can ada, with the re main ing com mis sioner ap pointed by a body es tab lished pur suant to sub sec tion 20(3) of the Act. The First Na tions Tax Com mis sioner Ap point ment There are of course a va ri ety of ways of in ter pret ing the force of "shared gov er nance" in this sit u a tion and we leave un ad dressed for the mo ment the ques tion of whether First Na tions pos sess sources of law giv ing them the ca pac ity to par tic i pate mean ing fully in some kind of sov er eignty-like divi sion, jointness or shared au thor ity. For now it is enough to note that the phe nom ena pose dif fi cul ties for the ex plana tory role of a key tool of an a lyt i cal le gal the ory: the of fi cialbased rule of rec og ni tion which con sti tutes and dis tin guishes a dis crete le gal sys tem from other so cial norms and systems. The rule's ap pli ca tion is stretched be yond cre du lity if we say that what marks the le gal ity and sys tem atic nature of this in ter ac tion is in cor po ra tion of First Na tions au thori ties by Ca na dian of fi cials' rec og ni tion of them. The na ture of the re la tion sim ply does not bear this out, to the ex tent that the Gov ern ment of Can ada it self rep re sents the re lation as one of shared gov er nance be tween dis tinct gov ernments. An ad e quate the o ret i cal un der stand ing of this sit ua tion may need to reach be yond the law-state model of le gal ity and le gal sys tem to un der stand the spe cial char acter is tics of intra-state le gal or ders which abut or over lap in var i ous ways the range of other le gal or ders with which they in ter act. In short, an ad e quate the ory of law must be able to an swer the ques tion "what is the re la tion be tween First Na tions' le gal or der and the le gal sys tem of Can ada?" What ever the an swer, it can not sim ply pre sume that First Na tions' claims and ex pe ri ence must be read through the lens of the ex tant and dom i nant Ca na dian law-state.
Trans-state Le gal ity
Equally chal leng ing, yet sig nif i cantly dif fer ent le gal phenom ena are found in sit u a tions where ap par ently non-state agents func tion like state agents in mak ing gen eral agreements out side the state which none the less bind cit i zens within the state. In sit u a tions of this kind, norms claim ing pe remp tory, con tent-in de pend ent force arise as a re sult of prac tice or con ven tion and are gen er ally rec og nized as holding that force with out ref er ence to au tho ri za tion of those norms by any particular law-state.
Our ex am ple is taken from the com plex and in creas ingly im por tant area of ocean re source gov er nance, and more spe cif i cally, in reg u la tion of fish ing of salmon which migrate across state bound aries and in ter na tional wa ters. The Green land Con ser va tion Agree ment pro vides for a seven year mor a to rium on com mer cial, non-sub sis tence salmon fish er ies in Green land's ter ri to rial wa ters, from the 2007 sea son for ward. 3 This agree ment ex tends the prac tice estab lished by a 2002 mor a to rium. The agree ment is signed by the "At lan tic Salmon Fed er a tion (ASF) of North Amer ica, the North At lan tic Salmon Fund (NASF) of Ice land, and the Or ga ni za tion of Fish er men and Hunt ers in Green land (KNAPK), three non-gov ern men tal or ga ni za tions…" and "…has been en dorsed by the Green land Home Rule Gov ernment which will help en force it…". 4 Sev eral as pects of this agree ment are rel e vant to an a lyt i cal the o ries of le gal ity, and their inclusion or exclusion of this phenomenon as an instance of legality or part of a legal order.
In as sess ing whether the mor a to rium might rep re sent a le gal norm or part of a le gal or der, it is sig nif i cant that its pro po nents are nei ther gov ern men tal bod ies nor rep re senta tives of gov ern ment; in fact, the in de pend ence of this agree ment from the law-state and in ter na tional law goes much fur ther. The At lan tic Salmon Fed er a tion draws its mem ber ship from both the United States and Can ada and as a transboundary non-gov ern ment or ga ni za tion is beholden to nei ther gov ern ment. The Home Rule Gov ern ment of Green land is a de volved au thor ity of the King dom of Denmark and lacks au thor ity to en ter into in ter na tional treaties. These and the other pro po nents have en tered into an agree ment which grows out of an agreed prac tice, re ly ing on so cial pres sure within this group for its ef fec tive ness and hav ing no ref er ence to the laws of any state ju ris dic tion as the laws of the agree ment or the le gal lo cus of dis pute res o lu tion with re spect to the agree ment. The agree ment none the less ex tends an ef fec tive, es tab lished mor a to rium on com mer cial salmon fish ing in Green land's waters, to the extent that where ten years ago 600 license holders fished those waters, now there are none.
A state-and of fi cial-based an a lyt i cal ap proach in ter prets this sit u a tion in a par tic u lar way: the agree ment-de rived ob li ga tion ap ply ing to all salmon fish ers in Green land's waters is a le gal norm in so far as the Green land Home Rule gov ern ment has en acted this norm or en dorsed it by author i ta tive cer tif i ca tion, out of the urg ing of NGOs, and under the au thor ity granted it by the King dom of Den mark to gov ern nat u ral re sources. The pre cise con tours of this norm can be as sessed by ob ser va tion of how Green land's of fi cials in fact han dle ap pli ca tion of the norm. Lit tle more need be said about this sit u a tion on the state-based an a lyt i cal approach, be cause the NGOs are just that and so are not parties to an in ter na tional treaty, and the Greenland Home Rule government is simply exercising its devolved powers.
This con ven tional an a lyt i cal view of course ex presses a plau si ble un der stand ing of the sit u a tion. Yet it seems to us that a kind of dis tort ing se lec tiv ity of em pha sis is ev i dent, and that se lec tiv ity points to short com ings in an ap proach which pre sumes that a jus ti fied as crip tion of le gal ity to some state of af fairs must be a state ment about mem ber ship in a sys tem of norms as so ci ated with an au tho riz ing law-state. In seek ing a state-based rule of rec og ni tion to ex plain the phe -nom ena, it seems the con ven tional view ob scures the spe cial for ma tive role of the NGOs in the agree ment, and in turn mis tak enly un der es ti mates the contri-bution of the Greenland Home Rule gov ern ment in reach ing an agree ment which falls short of an in ter na tional treaty, yet seems to be some thing other than sim ple in cor po ra tion into Green land law of nor ma tive con tent pre sented by lob by ing from NGOs from within and with out Green land. The ef fec tive ness of the mor a to rium and its in de pend ence from law-states re sem bles the emer gence of a le gal or der or sub sys tem from prac ticeeven as de scrip tion of the sit u a tion in these terms might be sur pris ing to some of the par tic i pants. This zone of in ter stitial, transboundary prima fa cie le gal ity might, of course, be af fected by Dan ish, Ca na dian or US gov ern ments' ac tiv i ties in in ter na tional trea ties in this area, but this is a fa mil iar mat ter: not all le gal norms are of equal force, nor are all legal or ders, sys tems and sub sys tems of equal force.
As with the case of self-gov er nance in Can ada, we are left with a puz zle: what is the le gal ity of ef fec tive pe remp tory norms which are formed by the sec ond ary rules of no partic u lar sys tem? More sim ply, what tells us whether these so cial phe nom ena are le gal or non-le gal, and if so, their sys tem mem ber ship and how that mem ber ship mat ters to their le gal ity? And again as with the case of intra-state legal ity dis cussed above, what ever the an swer to the question, it can not sim ply pre sume that what ap pear to function as le gal norms must have state-based origins.
Su pra-na tional le gal ity: the puz zle of the Eu ro pean Un ion
The pre ced ing ex am ple of non-state le gal ity men tioned a fa mil iar fea ture of in ter na tional law -that its ex is tence depends largely on the con sent of states. This ar range ment pre serves the sov er eignty of states as a fun da men tal norm of in ter na tional law while ground ing the force of in ter national le gal ob li ga tions in the will of states. Vol un tary agree -ment of the sort fa mil iar from in ter na tional law un doubtedly lies at the his toric foun da tion of the Eu ro pean Un ion; yet as the Un ion has evolved it has come to claim that it rep re sents a new le gal or der, nei ther a super-state nor an in ter gov ern men tal as so ci a tion. 5 But what is that le gal order? And what is the re la tion of that or der to ex pla na tions of le gal ity as fun da men tally sys temic in a sense best ev ident in the law-state? Julie Dick son use fully sug gests that the puz zling na ture of the Eu ro pean Un ion can be brought out by ask ing an in tu itively but mis lead ingly sim ple question: how many le gal sys tems are there in the EU? 6 As Dick son notes, there are sev eral pos si ble an swers: one le gal sys tem for ev ery mem ber-state; one le gal sys tem for ev ery mem ber-state plus one ad di tional Eu ro pean le gal sys tem; or only one, super-Eu ro pean le gal sys tem. If there is more than one sys tem -i. e. more than just one super-Eu ro pean le gal sys tem -how are le gal the o rists to char ac ter ize the rela tions be tween the sys tems? In par tic u lar, since both mem ber-state courts and the Eu ro pean Court of Jus tice have claimed su prem acy of fi nal au thor ity to in ter pret and ap ply Eu ro pean law, can we view ei ther mem ber-state le gal sys tems or a Eu ro pean le gal sys tem as in some mean ing ful sense de riv a tive, sub or di nate, or part of the other(s)? Or does this puz zle point us back to giv ing more se ri ous consideration to the possibility that the European Union's claimed "new legal order" really is something new and different, not usefully reduced to talk of legal system?
The an swers to all of these ques tions re quire prior answers to the ques tion of the na ture of le gal sys tem and the edges of a given le gal sys tem. What is also clear, how ever, is that a search for a rule of rec og ni tion for the Eu ro pean Un ion will not be of much help. What ever those an swers are, an of fi cial-based rule of rec og ni tion will likely not be 95 LEGAL SYSTEM, LEGALITY, AND THE STATE among them. Ques tions raised pre vi ously must be pressed again re gard ing the ex is tence of such a rule and its ex plana tory value. Are there le gal of fi cials of the Eu ro pean Un ion, per haps min i mally the judges of the Eu ro pean Court of Jus tice? If a mem ber-state's con sti tu tional court en forces a Eu ro pean law which de rives from a Eu ro pean treaty, are its of fi cials to count as Eu ro pean or Mem ber-State of fi cials? Lit tle ground is gained by sim ply "boot strap ping" from the pre sup po si tion that le gal ity's foun da tional unit is the state, since such a view is pre cisely what gives rise to the puz zling as pects of le gal ity of and within the Eu ro pean Un ion as we ask whether its new le gal or der is one or many. Here it seems to us that le gal the o rists such as Neil MacCormick are right to think that Eu ro pean law is in ad e quately the orized, not just be cause we lack an swers to these ques tions, but more im por tantly be cause it is likely we lack the the ory re quired to an swer them. 7
Super-State Le gal ity: claims to uni ver sal ity in pe remp tory jus cogens norms
In men tion ing the role of states' con sent in the ex is tence of in ter na tional law we omit ted iden ti fi ca tion of a fur ther ele ment of in ter na tional law: the rel a tively small set of jus cogens or pe remp tory gen eral norms of in ter na tional law. These norms pur port to bind states and their au thor i ties in de pend ently of any prior con sent: both his toric and newly cre ated law-states now ap pear ev ery where sub ject to a sort of sub strate of gen eral, pe remp tory norms which claim to form part of a uni ver sally su preme sys tem. 8 These norms 96 CULVER / GIUDICE have more re cently been em ployed to bind the lead ers of states, who might dis pute its ca pac ity for ap pli ca tion to them, as Slobodan Milosevic, for mer Pres i dent of Ser bia and Yu go sla via, fa mously did through out his trial. 9 A now-fa mil iar range of ju ris pru den tial ques tions emerges: is the ex is tence of jus cogens dem on stra tion that there is one global le gal sys tem, in which each law-state is but a subsys tem? What dis tin guishes one sub sys tem from an other? Or are pe remp tory in ter na tional norms part of some non-sys temic in ter na tional le gal or der in stead in cor po rated uni ver sally into oth er wise sep a ra ble state systems, so we have "one" international law inside the 'many' law-states? Or something else?
CIRCULARITY AND INDETERMINACY
We have so far of fered only an in tro duc tory di ag no sis of the prob lems fac ing an a lyt i cal le gal the o rists keen to use Hart's the ory of mu nic i pal law to ex plain novel phe nom ena. In this sec tion we deepen that crit i cism and ar gue that an alyt i cal the o rists fol low ing Hart's lead have failed to rec ognize that avail able ac counts of the na ture of le gal of fi cialsthose whose in ten tional prac tice gives rise to the ex is tence and reaches of a rule of rec og ni tion -are ei ther cir cu lar or in de ter mi nate, de priv ing the rule of rec og ni tion of con tent and lim it ing its ex plan a tory value. The prob lem of cir cu larity re fers to the bur den of iden ti fy ing le gal of fi cials with out pre sup pos ing a no tion of le gal va lid ity, which is sim ply the set of cri te ria of mem ber ship in a le gal sys tem prac tised by its of fi cials. The prob lem of in de ter mi nacy re fers to the burden of iden ti fy ing which sorts of ac tiv i ties or ex er cises of power in a le gal sys tem dis tin guish of fi cials from non-of fi cials. The short com ings of an a lyt i cal ap proaches to characterization 97 LEGAL SYSTEM, LEGALITY, AND THE STATE ga tion is per mit ted and which can be mod i fied only by a sub se quent norm of general in ter na tional law hav ing the same char ac ter. of of fi cials tend to un ravel the wider an a lyt i cal ac count of le gal sys tem. If our ar gu ment is plau si ble, an a lyt i cal approaches to le gal sys tem which de pend on the rule of recognition are open to the charge that they are lit tle more than a co her ent con cep tual frame work whose vi a bil ity as an ex pla na tion of ma jor fea tures of ac tual so cial life must be doubted to the ex tent that their con nec tion to ac tual social life is un ex plained, or at best ex plained in folk terms in ad e quate for the am bi tions of a de scrip tive-ex plan a tory philo soph i cal the ory of law.
Of fi cials by Of fice and At ti tude
Hart's the ory of law of fers many ad vances over John Austin's com mand the ory of law. Hart showed with ex cep tional clar ity that a the ory of law con structed from con cepts such as a so cial rule, the in ter nal point of view, con tent-in depend ent rea son, and un ion of pri mary and sec ond ary rules of fers a far better ex pla na tion of life un der law than a theory of law con structed out of the con cepts of or der, threat, sanc tion, habit of obe di ence, and le gally un lim ited sov ereign. In place of the no tion of a le gally un lim ited sov er eign Hart sup poses we ought to think in terms of rules of of fice, whereby of fi cial po si tions, with their con sti tu tive du ties and pow ers, en joy le gal au thor ity in de pend ently of the par tic ular per sons who con tin gently oc cupy those po si tions. Rules of of fice and rules of suc ces sion ex plain the con ti nu ity of legal sys tems through changes in leg is la tors and gov ernments and also ex plain the per sis tence of laws long af ter their cre ators have died. Yet be yond the as ser tion that le gal of fi cials ex ist by vir tue of spe cial rules of of fice and suc cession, Hart of fered lit tle to ex plain which rules iden tify who is to count as a le gal of fi cial, nor did he take any significant steps towards offering a philosophical explanation of what a legal official is.
Hart sup poses le gal of fi cials can be iden ti fied and dis tinguished from other hold ers of so cial of fice in the same way that le gal norms can be dis tin guished from other norms. A de tached ob server can sim ply look to see which rules of office are rec og nized and prac ticed in the le gal sys tem. Central cases of le gal of fi cials are de cep tively easy to find. They in clude judges, law yers, leg is la tors, po lice, and im mi gra tion of fi cers, among oth ers. There is, how ever, an im me di ate prob lem with an ac count of of fi cials which does no more than list ex am ples and ex plain their sta tus as of fi cials by claim ing that le gal of fi cials are those who oc cupy their po sitions by spe cial rules of of fice, suc ces sion, and com pe tence. Rules of of fice iden tify who is to count as an ap pel late judge, state law yer, po lice of fi cer, pro vin cial leg is la tor, immi gra tion of fi cer, but not who is to count as a "le gal of ficial". 10 This is per haps to be ex pected as par tic u lar le gal sys tems have an in ter est in iden ti fy ing spe cific le gal of ficials for the spe cific pur poses of those le gal sys tems, but no need for a gen eral ac count of the na ture of of fi cials. Phi loso phers of law pur su ing a gen eral ju ris pru dence are nonethe less left with a prob lem: with out an ac count of the shared fea tures which elu ci date and ex plain the ge nus "legal of fi cial", we are left bas ing what pur ports to be a compre hen sive, gen eral ju ris pru dence on a frag mented col lection of spe cies-level ac counts of ju di cial prac tices, prosecutorial prac tices, po lice prac tices, and so on. This sit u ation is of course un de sir able: while we might jus ti fi ably develop a com pre hen sive gen eral ju ris pru dence on less than a com plete de scrip tion of all prima fa cie le gal phe nom ena, we can not do so with any con fi dence in the re sult in the absence of a clear ac count of how we have gathered descriptions of how much of that phenomena -or at any rate a process rather more rigorous than simply assuming that we have in hand the descriptive data we need.
We can readily dem on strate the cir cu lar ity of the view that the le gal ity of le gal of fi cials can be grounded in the 99 LEGAL SYSTEM, LEGALITY, AND THE STATE same rea son ing that sup ports dis tinc tion of le gal from non-le gal rules. For a rule to count among the rules of a legal sys tem, it must be rec og nized. Yet rec og nized by whom? Pri vate cit i zens may con duct what ap pear to be acts of recog ni tion, but those acts have at most pro ba tion ary sta tus, await ing re view by of fi cials, as might oc cur in a sit u a tion where pri vate cit i zens ap ply le gal norms as best they can in the ab sence of rel e vant of fi cials. So rec og ni tion may come from cit i zens, but such rec og ni tion is not suf fi cient for val ida tion, which is nec es sar ily con ferred by the of fi cials of the le gal sys tem. Le gal of fi cials, then, are those who are recognized by the officials of a legal system.
Hart also claims, how ever, that of fi cials of a le gal sys tem nec es sar ily "ac cept" the rules of a le gal sys tem, es pe cially its sec ond ary rules, from an in ter nal point of view. In deed, that the of fi cials of a le gal sys tem ac cept the rule of rec ogni tion is one of two min i mum con di tions nec es sary and suf fi cient for the ex is tence of a le gal sys tem. 11 This require ment opens the way to a sec ond, com ple men tary yet sep a ra ble way to iden tify officials of a le gal sys tem: a descrip tive-ex plan a tory the o rist might look to see who ac cepts and prac tices the sec ond ary rules of rec og ni tion, change, and ad ju di ca tion, con duct ing this in ves ti ga tion in sit u a -100 CULVER / GIUDICE 11 As Hart puts it in a widely dis cussed pas sage: "On the one hand, those rules of be hav iour which are valid ac cord ing to the system's ul ti mate cri te ria of va lid ity must be gen er ally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of rec og ni tion spec i fy ing the cri te ria of le gal va lid ity and its rules of change and ad ju di ca tion must be ef fec tively ac cepted as com mon pub lic stan dards of of fi cial be hav iour by its of fi cials. The first con di tion is the only one which pri vate cit i zens need sat isfy: they may obey each 'for his part only' and from any mo tive what ever; though in a healthy so ci ety they will in fact of ten ac cept these rules as com mon stan dards of be hav iour and ac knowl edge an ob li ga tion to obey them, or even trace this ob li ga tion to a more gen eral ob li ga tion to re spect the con sti tu tion. The sec ond con di tion must also be sat is fied by the of fi cials of the sys tem. They must re gard these as com mon stan dards of of fi cial be hav iour and ap praise crit ically their own and each other's de vi a tions as lapses. Of course it is also true that be sides these there will be many pri mary rules which ap ply to of fi cials in their merely per sonal ca pac ity which they need only obey".
Hart, The Con cept of Law, 2nd. ed., Ox ford, Clar en don Press, 1994, pp. 116 and 117. It is worth not ing that this view sur vives con ces sions in the Post script to critics of the so cial rule the ory of le gal rules and the in ter nal point of view. tions where the dif fer ence be tween officials and pri vate cit izens is most likely to be starkly ev i dent. Such sit u a tions might in clude those where the ap pli ca tion con di tions of rules are un clear and of fi cials might be re vealed by their prac tice of step ping for ward to set the ap pli ca tion con ditions or make de ter mi na tions of the con tent of those rules. On this ap proach, of fi cials' iden tity and char ac ter is tic contri bu tion to a rule of rec og ni tion is as sessed by de tec tion of the pres ence of a spe cial nor ma tive at ti tude of com mit ment to sec ond ary rules, and at least obe di ence of pri mary or duty-im pos ing rules.
In tro duc tion of the idea of the in ter nal point of view does a great deal to en hance an a lyt i cal le gal the ory's ex plan a tory reach, yet even this ad di tion fails to solve the prob lem of dis tin guish ing of fi cials from cit i zens. Two re lated rea sons sup port this claim. First, pri vate cit i zens can also ac cept sec ond ary rules from an in ter nal point of view, as Hart's own ar gu ment makes clear. There is noth ing struc tur ally in co her ent -or func tion ally un re al is tic -in the idea of a pri vate cit i zen ac cept ing the con sti tu tion of her coun try as su preme law by in vok ing a right con tained in it to chal lenge a state or pro vin cial law. So while there is un de ni ably explanatory value in the dis tinc tion be tween in ter nal and ex ter nal points of view, the dis tinc tion is none the less insuf fi cient as a means to prac ti cal de tec tion or test ing for the dif fer ence between pri vate cit i zens and of fi cials. Questions need ing an swers re main: do cit i zens who adopt the in ter nal point of view to wards their le gal sys tem's sec ondary rules thereby be come of fi cials? If not, as we might plausi bly sup pose, why not? If there is no dif fer ence in kind between the at ti tudes of of fi cials and pri vate cit i zens, and the dif fer ence is in stead to be found in some thing like an ac cumu la tion of prac tice, is there some 'tip ping point'?
Sec ond, to the ex tent that this ap proach aug ments rather than re places the "rules of of fice" view, it pre sup poses rather than shows that of fi cials can al ready be iden ti fied by means of rules of of fice. Since both le gal of fi cials and pri -vate cit i zens can ac cept pri mary and sec ond ary rules from an in ter nal point of view, it must be that le gal of fi cials are those who also oc cupy a spe cial po si tion in the le gal sys tem by vir tue of the rules of of fice. How ever, as we have seen above, Hart has not pro vided any ad e quate ac count of which rules of office pick out legal officials.
Spe cu la ti ve So cial Anthro po lo gi cal Accounts
Some have ar gued that the cir cu lar ity of Hart's view is only ap par ent, and so causes no need for worry. 12 Such responses typ i cally amount to a de nial of the prob lem by trying to pro vide a foun da tion -of ten in what might be regarded as a 'boot strap ping' ap proach. Jules Coleman, Kent Greenawalt, and Brian Tamanaha all ap pear to have taken a route of this sort. Coleman ar gues, for ex am ple, that le gal of fi cials emerge as follows:
First, some group of in di vid u als -we do not call them of ficials and we need not iden tify them by ref er ence to lawschoose to have their be hav ior guided by a cer tain rule. In other words, they take the rule as giv ing them good rea sons for ac tion. If that rule takes hold in the sense of es tab lish ing mem ber ship cri te ria in a sys tem of rules, and if those rules are com plied with gen er ally, and if in sti tu tions of cer tain types are then cre ated, and so on, it is fair to say that a le gal sys tem ex ists. If a le gal sys tem ex ists, then that rule which guides the be hav ior of our ini tial group of in di vid u als is correctly de scribed as the rule of rec og ni tion for that le gal system. And those in di vid u als who guide their be hav ior by that rule are thus ap pro pri ately con ceived of as "of fi cials". They are, in a sense, of fi cials in vir tue of that rule, but they are not of fi cials prior to it (in ei ther the fac tual or the log i cal 102 CULVER / GIUDICE 12 Coleman's re sponse to a gen eral ver sion of the cir cu lar ity ob jec tion is an indi ca tion of the na ture and source of the ob jec tion -it has been raised in var i ous ways by more than one writer. We be lieve our set ting of the ob jec tion is orig i nal, yet ac knowl edge the ex is tence of prior ef forts, e.g., in 1988, prior to much of the ar gument we con sider be low, Mat thew Kramer pro vided a cir cu lar ity ob jec tion in "The Rule of Misrecognition in The Hart of Ju ris pru dence", Ox ford Jour nal of Le gal Studies, vol. 8, 1988, p. 401. sense). Their be hav ior makes the rule pos si ble, but it is the rule that makes them of fi cials. 13 Coleman's story is not that le gal of fi cials are those rec ognized by other le gal of fi cials by means of law, but rather that cer tain con duct gives rise to rules which in turn identify who is a le gal of fi cial. On this ac count there is no cir cle but in stead a kind of so cial fact ex pla na tion of le gal of fi cialdom -al beit one which does not ar rive with spec i fi ca tion on the set of so cial facts from which it is gen er ated. Sim i larly, in the course of an ex er cise in ap ply ing Hart's no tion of the rule of rec og ni tion to the United States, Kent Greenawalt sup poses the gen eral pop u lace is suf fi ciently able to identify le gal of fi cials that a foundation can be safely presumed:
At first glance, [Hart's] ac count may seem to in volve a troubling cir cu lar ity, since of fi cials de ter mine what are the standards of law and they de rive their of fi cial sta tus from the law. The break in the cir cle is that one looks to the pop u lation at large to see who are rec og nized as of fi cials. Or dinarily, peo ple's judg ments about who are of fi cials may rely on cer tain as sump tions about con for mance with le gal standards, such as elec tion laws, but peo ple need not un derstand the com plex cri te ria judges and other of fi cials use to de ter mine what counts as law. 14 Brian Tamanaha also ar gues that le gal of fi cials can be as sumed to have a suf fi ciently de ter mi nate ex is tence, conven tion ally established:
Re main ing with Hart's re sort to so cial prac tices, the fol lowing ad di tional re quire ment solves the prob lem of dis tin guishing le gal from non-le gal in sti tu tion al ized sys tems of nor mative or der: A "le gal" of fi cial is whom ever, as a mat ter of so cial prac tice, mem bers of the group (in clud ing le gal of fi cials them -selves) iden tify and treat as "le gal" of fi cials. Ow ing to their rec og nized sta tus as le gal of fi cials, their prod ucts (gen er ated pur su ant to the sec ond ary rules) are treated as 'law'. Systems of pri mary and sec ond ary rules that are ad min is tered by le gal of fi cials -so iden ti fied-are "le gal" sys tems. Systems of pri mary and sec ond ary rules that are not ad min istered by le gal of fi cials may be in sti tu tion al ized nor ma tive sys tems, but they are not le gal 15 [orig i nal em pha sis].
All three re sponses, how ever cau tious, are in ad e quate. Coleman's ex pla na tion seems to be close to sim ply pos it ing a state of normativity as he pre sumes some his tor i cal set of facts cor re spond ing to his de scrip tion. Does le gal or der and a co hort of of fi cials in fact arise in the way Coleman supposes? Is this the only way, or can of fi cials ever be come officials by re quest, rather than by "tak ing power" as his anal y sis seems to sug gest? Coleman's way out of the cir cular ity prob lem de pends on un sub stan ti ated em pir i cal claims, and reduces the ac count of of fi cials to a so cio log i cal ob serva tion rather than a philo soph i cal the ory: "the pow er ful can some times be come of fi cials". This looks very much like the spec u la tive an thro pol ogy Les Green at trib utes to Hart, and so marks lit tle ad vance over Hart's con struc tion of Rex I -a con struc tion in which Hart says ex plic itly that he does not sup pose he is de scrib ing any ac tual his tor i cal state of affairs. 16 Yet even if we do ac cept Coleman's view as a mod est ad vance with re spect to ex pla na tion of the foun da tion of a rule of rec og ni tion, that ad vance is in suf fi cient, since it still lacks a gen eral ex pla na tion of the na ture of of fi cial dom, and how it is to be iden ti fied in those other than the "first gener a tion" of of fi cials who gain ef fec tive con trol of power.
Greenawalt's ex pla na tion -that of fi cials are to be iden tified by see ing which per sons are rec og nized as such by the pop u la tion at large -is sim i larly frag ile. It sim ply as sumes that such rec og ni tion oc curs and pro vides no method for res o lu tion of sit u a tions where pop u lar rec og ni tion is divided, at odds with of fi cials' self-un der stand ing, or oth erwise un set tled. These omis sions from Greenawalt's view lead to other trou ble some ques tions. Does the pub lic have the knowl edge needed to make this judg ment? If the test, to be mean ing ful, takes as its pre con di tion the ex is tence of a knowl edge able pop u la tion, what sort of knowl edge counts, and how can it be de ter mined if a pop u la tion is suf fi ciently knowl edge able? Fur ther, will this ac tu ally gen er ate a philosoph i cally sat is fy ing ac count of of fi cials, or just a snap shot of the per cep tions of some group of cit i zens? Most im portantly, are we to con duct some sort of in ter na tional ag grega tion in or der to reach "the con cept of law" as op posed to "Amer i can" or "Ca na dian" or "Brit ish" un der stand ing of the na ture and iden tity of le gal of fi cials? How are we to avoid parochialism in our theory of law?
Tamanaha's thor oughly conventionalist the ory of le gal pos i tiv ism threat ens to give up en tirely on the pur suit of philo soph i cal ex pla na tion of the so cial foun da tions of law. Yet if we sup pose -as surely we must1 that in la bel ing a group of norm-sub jects as le gal of fi cials, le gal of fi cials and the wider group it self we are not do ing so willy-nilly, we owe an ex pla na tion of the ba sis of our rea son ing. What are the con cepts or cat e go ries em ployed, and are they con sis tent, co her ent, and part of an il lu mi nat ing pic ture of the social conditions which give rise to law? While Coleman's, Greenawalt's, and Tamanaha's ex plana tions might avoid the overt cir cu lar ity of views which sup pose that le gal of fi cials are sim ply those per sons rec ognized as such by other le gal of fi cials, they leave un spec i fied -where spec i fi ca tion is needed-the con nec tion of their views to so cio log i cal, his tor i cal, or an thro po log i cal ob ser vation. Yet even if we ac cept plau si bil ity of the of fered ways to es cape cir cu lar ity, an equally trou bling philo soph i cal problem awaits the spec u la tive an thro po log i cal ap proaches: inde ter mi nacy at the core of le gal ity and le gal of fi cial dom. On Coleman's ac count, which of the non-cir cu larly de ter mined rules iden tify who is a le gal of fi cial and which sorts of ac tivi ties de mar cate le gal of fi cials from pri vate cit i zens? On Greenawalt's and Tamanaha's ac counts, ac cord ing to what non-cir cu larly de vised cri te ria or un der stand ing are le gal of fi cials con ven tion ally iden ti fied? Are the cri te ria or un derstand ing co her ent, il lu mi nat ing, and ad e quate to the task? These un an swered ques tions dem on strate that the prob lem of in de ter mi nacy is to elucidate the philosophical concept of a legal official, and that it is a problem which runs deeper than the problem of circularity.
It is im por tant to emphasise at this point that the problem of in de ter mi nacy is not one of sim ply search ing for a line which dis tin guishes le gal of fi cials from pri vate cit i zens. Such a view sup poses that clear cri te ria al ready ex ist, which are in turn com pat i ble with fuzzy bor ders. Rather, the prob lem of in de ter mi nacy points to the fact that an a lyti cal the o ries lack an ac count of the kind or con tent of roles or pow ers which serve the the o ret i cal role of dis tin guish ing le gal of fi cials from non-of fi cials. In other words, the problem is not just one about look ing for de ter mi nate, hardedged cat e go ries for sort ing par tic u lars rep re sent ing conten tious bor der line cases, but rather pos i tive cri te ria for choice of par tic u lars to be explained at all, far prior to finding and facing borderline cases.
Per haps part of the stub born ness of the prob lem of in deter mi nacy can be at trib uted to the fact that the no tion of an "of fi cial" is not unique to law. While rules of of fice iden tify judges, law yers, and so on, rules of of fice also iden tify univer sity pres i dents, bank man ag ers, and Na tional Hockey League ref er ees -some times in very con fus ing ways as the rules of sports such as rugby are ex plic itly named "laws". 17 In ter est ingly, pri vate cit i zens also seem able to cre ate rules of of fice. Of ten pri vate cit i zens con tract to cre ate per sonal or pri vate se cu rity guards, whose pro fes sional ob li ga tions are to en force, among other things, le gal rules against theft and as sault. In deed, in many mod ern le gal sys tems, cit izens have a le gally rec og nized power of ar rest, and ex ercises of such a power can be treated as state ac tions. 18 What ever the pro ba tive value of these re marks on the fac tors com pli cat ing ex pla na tion of the role of of fi cials in con sti tut ing le gal ity, prob lems re main for pro po nents of an ap proach which as sumes Hart's pic ture of an of fi cial-op erated rule of rec og ni tion rest ing at the foun da tions of le gal or der. Which of fi cials are le gal of fi cials? What costs are incurred by a the ory de pend ent on an ac count of le gal of ficials when cir cu lar ity and in de ter mi nacy char ac ter ize the the ory's at tempts to solve at more than an in tu itive level the prob lem of de mar cat ing le gal of fi cials from other norm sub jects? These ques tions re main un re solved, we con tend, on the rep re sen ta tive approaches adopted by Hart, Coleman, Greenawalt, and Tamanaha.
AN INTER-INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Pre ced ing ar gu ment sets the chal lenge and stan dard to be met by any sup ple ment to an a lyt i cal le gal the ory's ap proach to le gal ity. If we are right and the of fi cial-based approach is be yond re pair, a new ap proach must at least avoid the meta-the o ret i cal-evaluative vices of cir cu lar ity and in de termi nacy, while pro vid ing a pos i tive the o ret i cal ac count of the dis tin guish ing char ac ter is tics of le gal ity. What ever the content of the pos i tive ac count, it must amount to more than an ab stract ver sion of fa mil iar prac tices, jus ti fied post facto via nar row boot strap ping from some imag ined past sit u ation. The re sult ing ac count of le gal ity must, among other vir tues, be able to ex plain the novel prima fa cie le gal phenom ena we sur veyed in the first part of our pa per. We shall also count as a vir tue of our ap proach its con sis tency with the ex pe ri ence and un der stand ing of or di nary cit i zenswhile sound the ory may some times re quire re vi sion of some in tu itions, ac counts of so cial phe nom ena are pref er a ble to the ex tent that they make sense of our ex pe ri ence in terms which res o nate with our pre-the o ret i cal re flec tive un derstand ing of that ex pe ri ence.
We have de scribed our re sponse to this chal lenge as an "inter-in sti tu tional the ory". Our ap proach is rooted in an ac count of in sti tu tions, and re la tions amongst groups of insti tu tions which de serve to be re garded as le gal. Since this ap proach in volves a po ten tially un fa mil iar re com bi na tion of el e ments al ready ev i dent in other ju ris pru den tial writ ing, it may be use ful to have a quick pro spec tus in hand for ref erence as the ar gu ment un folds. Per haps the quick est way to sit u ate our ap proach is in terms of its ex pe ri en tial point of de par ture, and the con trast be tween that point and Hart's view. Hart fa mously sets out in The Con cept of Law from the un der stand ing of mod ern mu nic i pal law avail able to the ordi nary man. Part of the con ten tion of this pa per has been that this de par ture point is no lon ger what it was. Even while we re main sym pa thetic to Hart's meta-the o ret ical-evaluative com mit ment to the o riz ing in ways com prehen si ble by pri vate cit i zens, the chang ing ex pe ri ence of life un der law com pels us to start our ex plan a tory work at a dif fer ent point. Our or di nary cit i zen trav els much more than Hart's cit i zen ever did, and our or di nary cit i zen finds norms in fam i lies, or per haps bunches or clus ters, op er ated by in sti tu tional own ers of vary ing au thor ity, from schools to Greenpeace to the Brit ish Air port Au thor ity to the UN Se curity Coun cil and Dis ney land. Le gal ity and le gal norms have a par tic u lar prac ti cal force in the or di nary cit i zen's life, but their na ture and force is not, we con tend, best un der stood by search ing for lad ders or chains of au thor ity for par tic ular norms. Rather, a spa tial met a phor seems better suited: in the com plex web of norms of var i ous kinds en coun tered by pri vate cit i zens, le gal norms rep re sent a kind of upwelling of nor ma tive force, es pe cially force ful stan dards clus tered around par tic u lar kinds of life events, rel a tively sta ble nor ma tive ref er ence points in a con text of con stant com pe ti tion amongst norms. How then can we ac count for what is distinctively legal, the particular upwelling of normative force which occurs in states, in intra-and ex trastate forms, often in systemic fashion, but sometimes only in proto-systemic fashion?
Our ac count is based in what is com mon to the ex pe riences sketched above, the or di nary cit i zen's en coun ter ing prima fa cie le gal norms not one by one as seen in Hart's grad ual ex pan sion of a no tional prim i tive so ci ety's form of so cial or der, but in clus ters ori ented around in sti tu tional pur poses and func tions. In sti tu tions, on our view, con tain var i ous kinds of norm-sub jects hold ing un der vary ing condi tions pow ers to use in sti tu tion ally-owned norms. Our account of sys tems of norms will rely on elab o ra tion of an idea men tioned in the in tro duc tion, that of in ten sity of mutual ref er ence among in sti tu tions and their norm-us ers. De part ing from cit i zens' ex pe ri ence of webs of norms leads us to dis cuss pow ers, in sti tu tions and sys tems in gen eral terms first, with ex em plary ref er ence to le gal in sti tu tions and sys tems. We will then ap proach the key prob lem -finding grounds for de mar ca tion of le gal norms, in sti tu tions, and sys tems from other forms of nor ma tive so cial or der. We ground our as crip tion of le gal ity to the in sti tu tional nor mative sys tem char ac ter is tic of the law-state via re-use of the only con tent re stric tion Hart places on the clus ter of norms at the heart of an en dur ing le gal sys tem -the min i mum con tent of nat u ral law. The re sult ing view en ables us to cap ture the pri mus inter pares na ture of the law-state as a man i fes ta tion of le gal or der, while rec og niz ing none the less the le gal ity of non-state bod ies claim ing au thor ity to is sue con tent-in de pend ent pe remp tory norms. These be gin nings of an analytical alternative to the official-based account of legality will then be tested against the task of un der standing the place of the law-state.
Le gal-Nor ma tive Pow ers, In sti tu tions of Law and Le gal In sti tu tions
While avail able space pre vents us from elab o rat ing fully the na ture of nor ma tive pow ers, enough can be said here to be gin to sup port an al ter na tive to the of fi cial-based approach to le gal ity and iden ti fi ca tion of le gal ity's bor der. Norma tive pow ers can be dis tin guished along two gen eral dimen sions: type and force. Within the di men sion of type and fo cus ing on fa mil iar le gal-nor ma tive pow ers, we fol low Joseph Raz in as sert ing three over lap ping but con cep tu ally dis tinct cat e go ries of nor ma tive power: 19 pow ers to de termine, al ter, and en force le gal-nor ma tive sit u a tions. Within the di men sion of force, there are also three over lap ping but con cep tu ally dis tinct cat e go ries: le gal-nor ma tive pow ers can dif fer in terms of scope of norm-sub jects af fected, du ration of their ex er cise, and as ser tion of in sti tu tional force. Anal y sis of le gal ity in terms of le gal-nor ma tive pow ers leads to a kind of ma trix view of the in ter ac tion of those le galnor ma tive pow ers. This view rec og nizes the very wide range of pos si ble com bi na tions of le gal-nor ma tive pow ers of several types and vary ing force, op er ated by a range of normsub jects from judges to pri vate se cu rity guards and in corpo rated bod ies. It also sup ports the ob ser va tion that le galnor ma tive pow ers can come in many dif fer ent va ri et ies used by var i ous norm-sub jects, which ex plains why the official/ non-of fi cial di vide is in suf fi ciently sen si tive to be of much explan a tory use in lo cat ing the source and bor ders of le gal ity (We will leave for the mo ment the ques tion of how to dis tinguish le gal from non-le gal nor ma tive pow ers, since that argu ment re quires the next sec tion's elab o ra tion of what we mean by in sti tu tions wield ing pow ers).
Dis cus sion of le gal-nor ma tive pow ers dem on strates the com plex ity of the nor ma tive web in which of fi cials and others live, but it does lit tle to de mar cate dis tinc tively le gal areas of that web -we have sim ply added to our de scrip -tive-ex plan a tory ar moury the no tion of nor ma tive pow ers of var i ous kinds. Achieve ment of that task re quires, on our view, at ten tion to the in sti tu tional con text in which of ficials, non-of fi cials, part-time of fi cials and so on wield norma tive pow ers. This fo cus on ap proach to con text or sys tem rather than in di vid ual norm-sub ject or class of norm-subject is of course not new. So cial net work the o rists have for more than fifty years sought to il lu mi nate com plex so cial sit u a tions by look ing be yond the his tory of agents who sit as "nodes" in "net works", in quir ing in stead into the re lations and ex changes be tween nodes. 20 As pects of this analy sis can be use fully trans ferred to as sist char ac ter iza tion of le gal ity and its bor ders with other so cial norms, view ing legal ity's nodes as those in sti tu tions whose in hab it ants (includ ing but not lim ited to of fi cials) re late to other in sti tutions via operation of the diverse sorts of legal powers (and obligations, etcetera) we have briefly discussed.
Since le gal in sti tu tions are at the heart of our view, we should clar ify the sense of 'in sti tu tion' we use, dis tin guishing it from its gen eral sense in or di nary lan guage and multi ple senses in law and le gal the ory. Other in sti tu tional theo rists such as Neil MacCormick have made sus tained use of the idea of in sti tu tion in ex plain ing prac tices char ac ter ized as in sti tu tions of law, such as con tract, de clar a tory judgment, and crim i nal law. 21 An in sti tu tion of law, on MacCormick's view, may be viewed as en cap su lat ing a le gal doc trine com prised of a clus ter of re lated norms which united serve a sin gle or lim ited num ber of pur poses. This in sti tu tional clus ter of norms may be used in var i ous ar eas of life un der law, of ten within or ga ni za tions con fus ingly labelled "le gal in sti tu tions", which per sist over time while oper at ing some range of so cial func tions rec og nized as "in sti -111 tu tions of law". Both quite dif fer ent uses of "in sti tu tion" rely for their in tel li gi bil ity on ref er ence to wider so cial no tions of in sti tu tions. For ex am ple, the 'in sti tu tion' of con tract and the "in sti tu tion" of queu ing at bus stops share re li ance on shared con cep tions of a de sir able so cial func tion per formed by co or di nated prac tices with gen er ally rec og nized prompts and re sponses en abling op er a tion of the func tion. Sim i larly, the idea of in sti tu tion as a nor ma tive, func tion-ori ented orga ni za tion in cor po rat ing a clus ter of com plex nor ma tive prac tices such as con tract or queu ing trans fers readily to the le gal con text from ad di tional social contexts. Courts are readily understood as normative, function-oriented institutions, as are primary schools, the Red Cross, and the Scouting movement.
Gen eral dis cus sion of so cial in sti tu tions must also face the ques tion we left be hind in our dis cus sion of nor ma tive pow ers: how to get from in sti tu tions qua com plex prac tices and in sti tu tions qua clus ters of com plex prac tices to an account of in sti tu tions of law and le gal in sti tu tions. Es cape from prob lems of cir cu lar ity and in de ter mi nacy ham per ing the of fi cial-based ac count of le gal ity is not enough. We must make sense of (i) the dis tinc tive role of in sti tu tions of law as sources of nor ma tive in puts to prac ti cal rea son ingas spe cial au thor i ta tive sources of spe cial rights, claims, ob li ga tions, et cet era. dis tin guish able from the wider class of in sti tu tions of so cial fact. A de fence of in san ity in a crim inal law sys tem, for ex am ple, is an in sti tu tion of law, while rais ing one's hand in class is not. What are the iden tity con di tions of le gal ity which mark the dif fer ence? We need ad di tion ally (ii) some way of dis tin guish ing le gal in sti tu tions from other nor ma tive so cial in sti tu tions such as churches and fra ter nal or ga ni za tions. Ac counts of (i) and (ii) are clearly re lated: as an a lyt i cal le gal the o rists rightly maintain, it is not pos si ble to dis tin guish in sti tu tions of law or le gal norms from other in sti tu tions or norms by means of the con tent of in di vid ual institutions or norms. Rather, the legality of institutions of law is constituted by their connection to or practice by legal institutions.
The ac counts, then, ought to be in ter de pen dent in their fo cus ing si mul ta neously on the iden tity of in sti tu tions of law and le gal in sti tu tions. Yet it is sur pris ing to note that while in sti tu tional the o rists have rich ac counts of in sti tutions of law, rel a tively lit tle has been said about the iden tity of le gal in sti tu tions. For ex am ple, af ter pro vid ing a so phis ticated ac count of in sti tu tions of law in terms of institutive, con se quen tial, and terminative rules, MacCormick says this about social institutions:
Te dious though the rea son ing which leads to the def i ni tion [of in sti tu tions of law] is, it is im por tant that we should have de fined the term clearly. For there is an other use of the term "in sti tu tion" which is also of great im por tance in re la tion to the law, but which is quite dif fer ent from the well-es tablished law yer's no tion of a "le gal in sti tu tion" which I have just ex pli cated. There are cer tain types of so cial sys tem or sub-sys tem, such as uni ver si ties, schools, hos pi tals, orphan ages, li brar ies, sport ing or gani sa tions and the like, to which we of ten re fer as "in sti tu tions". These are or gani sations of peo ple which re tain their or gani sa tional iden tity through time even though their per son nel may change, because they are get ting on with some job, and get ting on with it in an or gan ised way. Such I shall call "so cial in sti tu tions". To this class it is ob vi ous that courts, par lia ments, po lice forces, civil ser vice de part ments, the Fac ulty of Ad vo cates, and the Law So ci ety, all be long. These are of course, so cial in sti tu tions which ex ist to per form le gal func tions, hence the pos si bil ity of con fu sion with the con cept "in sti tu tion of the law". 22 There is much of in ter est in the sec ond sense of in sti tution qua "so cial sys tem or sub sys tem", and much de pends on its ex pla na tion and iden tity con di tions as an ex plan atory tool amount ing to more than a syn onym for "sys tem".
In par tic u lar, if we are to take the per for mance of le gal func tions un der stood as in sti tu tions of law as the cri te rion for se lec tion of le gal in sti tu tions from among the wider class of so cial in sti tu tions, sev eral ques tions then need answers: what is it about the 'or gan ised' per for mance of le gal func tions un der stood as in sti tu tions of law that gives rise to le gal in sti tu tions? Can le gal in sti tu tions over lap via shared in sti tu tions of law? How can we as sess the edges or bound aries of le gal in sti tu tions? Ad mit tedly, some of these ques tions con cern atyp i cal in stances of le gal in sti tu tions, so we need not an swer them all im me di ately. Yet even a rudi men tary inter-in sti tu tional ac count of le gal ity and le gal sys tem must en gage the cen tral ques tion of how core or typ i cal le gal in sti tu tions amount to a legal system, so we now turn to that question via a deeper account of legal institutions and their interaction.
Le gal ins ti tu tions: a dee per ac count
It is tempt ing to de fine a le gal in sti tu tion by fol low ing one of the us ages re ported in Black's Law Dic tio nary -and consis tent with MacCormick's view iden ti fied in the quo ta tion above-which char ac ter izes a le gal in sti tu tion such as a gov ern ment de part ment as an ag glom er a tion of in sti tu tions of law. On this un der stand ing, a le gal in sti tu tion rep re sents topic-spe cific de ploy ment of in sti tu tions of law pe cu liar to its le gal-in sti tu tional fo cus, to gether with sup port ing in stitu tions of law ca pa ble of use in var i ous le gal con texts yet given spe cific con tent and dis tinc tive prac tice in ap pli ca tion to the le gal in sti tu tion's topic-spe cific pur poses. For ex ample, in Can ada the fed eral De part ment of Fish er ies and Oceans qua le gal in sti tu tion de ploys in sti tu tions of law specific to fish er ies man age ment, yet ad di tion ally uses in special form in sti tu tions of law with mul ti ple forms of ap pli cation given spe cial ex pres sion in the con text of fish er ies and oceans, e. g., in junc tions. As a de scrip tion of le gal in sti tutions and their use of in sti tu tions of law this sketch is likely un ob jec tion able to many an a lyt i cal le gal the o rists to the extent that it is more or less a re-de scrip tion of el e ments of the an a lyt i cal ac count, al beit at a higher level of or ga ni zation. Yet as an ac count of the emer gence and bor ders of legal ity the cir cu lar ity of this view is plain. The le gal ity of insti tu tions of law is traced to their in ter con nected use by le gal in sti tu tions, yet le gal in sti tu tions are iden ti fied as an ag glom er a tion of uses of in sti tu tions of law. The prob lem of in de ter mi nacy is also pres ent. Do le gal in sti tu tions have spe cial func tions or fea tures which sup port a criterial or con tent-de rived way of dis tin guish ing them from other social institutions? In other words, do legal institutions have a special subject-matter? The challenges of circularity and indeterminacy force us to supplement the picture presented so far.
Ground ing Le gal Sys tem: Mu tual Ref er ence and In ten sity
An ac count of the sys tem-con sti tut ing na ture of le gal insti tu tions re lies on an un der stand ing of 'sys tem.' There are of course a wide range of un der stand ings of the no tion of sys tem, sub-sys tem, and so on. For our pur pose in pro viding a con tri bu tion to the gen eral part of a the ory of law, a broad and gen eral un der stand ing of sys tem will suf fice, at least un til we as sess whether it can bear the weight of our ex pla na tion of the spe cial char ac ter of a le gal sys tem. Draw ing from an in tu itive un der stand ing of sys tem fa mil iar from talk of so cial sys tems as di verse as leg is la tive as semblies, teams, re li gious com mu ni ties, or vol un tary as so ci ations, let us ab stract an ex pla na tion of so cial sys tem as a com po si tion of in ter de pen dent parts re lated by mu tual ref erence with re spect to some shared fo cal ac tiv ity (some times a very broad fo cus), oc cur ring at some thresh old of in tensity. So cial sys tems of var i ous kinds can be cap tured by this broad def i ni tion -a school sys tem, for ex am ple, is a sys tem by mu tual ref er ence of its ed u ca tion-fo cussed schools (which con tain in sti tu tions of teach ing, head-or prin ci pal-ship, stu dent study and con duct, pa ren tal par tic ipa tion, and so on) with a cer tain in ten sity in ex change of in for ma tion (and some times per sons) re lated to those in stitu tions, for ex am ple cur ric u lum, bud gets, stu dent re sults, ath letic teams and so on. While it may be im pos si ble to spec ify min i mum thresh olds of in ten sity of mu tual ref erence in the ab stract, which will no doubt vary from one con text to an other, it is none the less clear that such thresholds ex ist in the sense that there are clear ex am ples of recog ni tion of non-sys tems and col lapsed sys tems, from the dis so lu tion of sports leagues due to per sis tent failures to communicate matters such as scheduling, to collapses of school systems attributed to a lack of leadership connecting institutions within and among various schools.
Ground ing Le gal Sys tem: Min i mum Con tent of Nat u ral Law
In keep ing with our in sti tu tion-fo cussed ap proach, the pre ced ing dis cus sion of mu tual ref er ence and in ten sity is still one step re moved from both dis cus sion of par tic u lar norms and the le gal ity of those norms. Since we see in sti tutional in ter ac tion as the core of le gal ity, we fo cus on ex plana tion of that phe nom ena, while rec og niz ing that the identity of in di vid ual con trib ut ing in sti tu tions and norms (and per sons us ing pow ers to wield norms) re mains an a lyt i cally avail able as a mat ter of sub di vi sion of net works of le gal insti tu tions. It re mains none the less to get past our some what elu sive dis cus sion of so cial sys tems hav ing some shared focal ac tiv ity, and on to an ac count of the shared fo cal ac tivity of le gal sys tems. 23 Here we pro pose to em ploy a rad i cally underutilized feature of Hart's view of le gal sys tem: the min i mum con tent of nat u ral law the sis. 24 Hart fa mously ar gues that given certain log i cally con tin gent but nat u rally nec es sary fea tures of hu man and so cial life, any le gal sys tem must in clude ba sic rules re strict ing the free use of vi o lence, se cur ing prop erty, and en forc ing prom ises. With out such con tent, a le gal system can not hope to per sist or pro vide sup port for any other rules. There are at least two rea sons why the min i mum con tent of nat u ral law the sis has not served, as we think it can, as a gen eral fea ture which helps iden ti fi ca tion and distinc tion of le gal sys tems from other so cial sys tems. First, at ten tion has been un for tu nately con cen trated on the question of whether Hart's ad mis sion of a min i mum con tent of nat u ral law re veals that his le gal pos i tiv ism is un ten a ble, de spite his ar gu ment to the con trary. 25 Sec ond, Hart mislead ingly avoids de scrib ing the the sis as a con cep tual claim, opt ing in stead to ex plain it as a "nat u ral ne ces sity"; it is only a fact about le gal sys tems be cause of the na ture of hu mans and so cial life as they are, and so it is con cep tu ally pos si ble to imag ine le gal sys tems which do not need such con tent. The up shot of iden ti fy ing a nat u ral ne ces sity is that it im plies that the claim is not part of a con cep tual the ory of law and le gal sys tem, which only in cludes nec essary or con cep tual truths about law. How ever, this view of what is prop erly in cluded within a con cep tual the ory of law and le gal sys tem is mis taken. As we have sug gested above and can ar gue only par tially here, a de scrip tive-ex plan a tory ac count of law and le gal sys tem as a con tri bu tion to the gen eral part of law ought to in clude amongst its vir tues iden ti fi ca tion and il lu mi na tion of the fea tures of the phenom ena by which or di nary cit i zens un der stand them. These fea tures may com prise ei ther nec es sary fea tures or con tin gent re la tions or most likely both. While it is use ful to test the con cep tual reaches of con cepts by imag in ing log ically pos si ble worlds, what is more important for theories of legality and legal system which value accuracy in description of social reality is that they account for how those in life under law understand their experiences.
We in tend to use Hart's min i mum con tent of nat u ral law the sis as it was in tended, as a gen er ally ob serv able fea ture of le gal sys tems which iden ti fies a core 26 sub ject mat ter or con tent of law. In our ac count, re la tions of mu tual ref erence be tween so cial in sti tu tions give rise to le gal ity and legal sys tem of the kind as so ci ated with the law-state when the ob jects or con tents of those re la tions com bine to cover, via op er a tion of di verse kinds of le gal-nor ma tive pow ers, these min i mum con di tions of so cial life. No tice, then, that it is not pos si ble to dem on strate the le gal ity of any par tic u lar le gal in sti tu tion by iso lat ing at ten tion to its par tic u lar purpose or func tion. Le gal ity only emerges from the web of inter ac tions of le gal in sti tu tions which aim at least at se curing a min i mum con tent of nat u ral law. 27 Other forms of le gal ity may be ac knowl edged un der this view, but they tend, on our ac count, to have what might re garded as "subsys tem" qual i ties, better un der stood on our spa tial met aphor as upwellings of le gal ity lack ing the core con tent charac ter is tic of le gal sys tems con cerned with foun da tional el e ments of le gal ity. It might be help ful, fol low ing our met aphor, to view non-sys temic upwellings of le gal ity as clus ters of le gal in sti tu tions, a kind of le gal or der anal o gous to le gal sys tem and com posed some times of iden ti cal kinds of parts, but in no sense prop erly re garded as nec es sar ily a de vel op men tally prim i tive ver sion of a proper le gal sys tem. Sev er ing sys tem from le gal ity is cru cial to this pic ture, both as a mat ter of ac cu rate the o ret i cal re flec tion of forms of intra-state legality, and, as we shall see, to reflection on the nature of the connection between law and state which constitutes the familiar term "law-state".
It might nat u rally be asked at this junc ture how we have evaded cir cu lar ity and in de ter mi nacy, and what has taken up the ex plan a tory role pre vi ously played by of fi cials. On our view, of fi cials re tain an im por tant though re duced role in an ex pla na tion of le gal ity and le gal sys tem to the ex tent that they are among the op er a tors of in sti tu tions of law. Their the o ret i cal im por tance is de creased by our fo cus on le gal in sti tu tions within which of fi cials are but one kind of norm-sub ject and op er a tor of in sti tu tions of law since or dinary cit i zens as sert ing, e. g., con sti tu tional rights might also from time to time (so ir reg u larly) op er ate in sti tu tions of law in le gal in sti tu tions. More over our fo cus on the in tensity of in ter ac tion be tween le gal in sti tu tions as the driv ing force of le gal ity and a con sti tu tive el e ment of le gal sys tem gets out from be neath the search for log i cally prim i tive units of le gal ity from which a pic ture of sys tem might be found. In stead we have pos ited a con cep tual scheme which may be tested for ad e quacy against the ex plan a tory needs of in quir ers, the meta-the o ret i cal-evaluative vir tues of sound de scrip tive-ex plan a tory the ory, and the ca pac ity of the the ory to ad dress suit ably gen er al ized so cial phe nomena -we of fer, af ter all, a con tri bu tion to gen eral ju ris prudence, and not a test or roadmap for con struc tion of success ful le gal sys tem. So our ap proach aims, as Hart did, to pro vide a uni ver sal con cept of law while rec og niz ing the vari abil ity of hu man ex pe ri ence in par tic u lar con cep tions of law. Our ap proach none the less avoids the in de ter mi nacy prob lem since we posit within our ex plan a tory scheme the min i mum con tent of a le gal sys tem to gether with a con ceptual ac count of the reach of the sys tem in its char ac ter is tic in cor po ra tion of the au thor i ta tive, con tent-in de pend ent peremp tory norms within in sti tu tions of law in turn within legal in sti tu tions. Since those le gal in sti tu tions mark the end point of our search for le gal ity, any re main ing bat tle over the edges of le gal ity and le gal sys tem will come not at the level of the ques tion of who counts as an of fi cial, but in highly lo cal and par tic u lar ar gu ments re gard ing the suffi-ciency of the in ten sity of mu tual reference among so cial insti tu tions ex hib it ing the con cep tu ally nec es sary fea tures of legal institutions.
LEGALITY AND THE DE-CENTRED LAW-STATE
With an un der stand ing of le gal ity and le gal sys tem in hand, we can re turn to our orig i nal mo ti va tion in seek ing to es tab lish an al ter na tive to a Hart-de rived ap proach to le gality and le gal sys tem: the rise of novel prima facie legal phenomena.
We iden ti fied in sec tion 1 above some of the phe nom ena as so ci ated with ar gu ments re gard ing the "de-cen tring" or "hol low ing out" the state, ad di tion ally vis i ble in fa mil iar phe nom ena from the rise of in ter na tional hu man i tar ian law to un prec e dented har mo ni za tion of stan dards for, e. g., infor ma tion and fi nan cial ex changes. How ever one mea sures, states to day are far more inter-re lated and inter-de pend ent than a cen tury ago, much as Hart ob served in 1961 in argu ment con tra Aus tin that ab so lute au ton omy was not then, and long had not been a re al is tic ex pec ta tion of state con duct. Yet while socio-le gal the o rists are cor rect to dislodge the con cep tual as so ci a tion be tween law and the state, we con tend that they are mis taken to en dorse le gal plu ralism in its place. Our inter-in sti tu tional ac count of le gal ity pro vides the ba sis for ar gu ment that the re la tion be tween le gal ity and states is log i cally con tin gent, and em pir i cal accounts of intra-and inter-state ac tiv ity re veal that the asser tion of log i cal con tin gency is born out in fact. In other words, inter-in sti tu tional in ter ac tion, and not state ac tiv ity, best ex plains what is spo ken of as the le gal ity of mu nic i pal, trans na tional, and international law, all without falling into pluralism or awkward metaphorical distinctions of 'soft law' from 'hard law' and so on.
One par tic u larly vivid way to dem on strate the con tingency of the con nec tion be tween le gal ity and states is to contrast a fa mil iar an a lyt i cal ex pla na tion against the inter-in sti tu tional view we have set out. In The Con cept of Law Hart ex plains how the rule of rec og ni tion spec i fies and ranks di verse sources of law, al low ing a de tached ob server to as sess the mem ber ship of any pu ta tive mem ber-rule of the sys tem by pull ing on a chain of va lid ity. Con sider Hart's il lus tra tion:
The sense in which the rule of rec og ni tion is the ul ti mate rule of a sys tem is best un der stood if we pur sue a very fa miliar chain of le gal rea son ing. If the ques tion is raised whether some sug gested rule is le gally valid, we must, in or der to answer the ques tion, use a cri te rion of va lid ity pro vided by some other rule. Is this pur ported by-law of the Oxfordshire County Coun cil valid? Yes: be cause it was made in ex er cise of the pow ers con ferred, and in ac cor dance with the pro cedure spec i fied, by a stat u tory or der made by the Min is ter of Health. At this first stage the stat u tory or der pro vides the cri te ria in terms of which the va lid ity of the by-law is assessed. There may be no prac ti cal need to go far ther; but there is a stand ing pos si bil ity of do ing so. We may query the va lid ity of the stat u tory or der and as sess its va lid ity in terms of the stat ute em pow er ing the min is ter to make such or ders. Fi nally, when the va lid ity of the stat ute has been que ried and as sessed by ref er ence to the rule that what the Queen in Par lia ment en acts is law, we are brought to a stop in in quiries con cern ing va lid ity: for we have reached a rule which, like the in ter me di ate stat u tory or der and stat ute, pro vides cri te ria for the as sess ment of the va lid ity of other rules; but it is also un like them in that there is no rule pro vid ing cri teria for the as sess ment of its own le gal va lid ity. 28 Hart was sim ply il lus trat ing op er a tion of the rule of recog ni tion and clearly did not in tend this il lus tra tion as a formu laic ac count of le gal sys tem, yet it is none the less in adver tently misleading.
There is, in par tic u lar, a mis lead ing sug ges tion of a hi erar chi cal struc ture of le gal va lid ity in Hart's talk of an ul timate rule of rec og ni tion and a chain of le gal rea son ing.
While this style of pre sen ta tion might have some vir tue as a clear and in tu itive sort of sum mary, con tem po rary so cial re al ity seems rather more com plex. The sources of le gal valid ity are not foun da tional in the sense that there is an ul timate cri te rion -such as "what ever the Queen in Par liament en acts is law"-which give all the other sub or di nate cri te ria and rules their va lid ity. Or if there is such a cri terion, its ex is tence is at best a no tional sum mary, since it can never be spec i fied be yond as ser tion that it emerges from the shared co-op er a tive ac tiv i ties of of fi cials -whose iden tity can not be spec i fied in a non-cir cu lar way. This hier ar chi cal view also dis re garded the ex tent to which the activ i ties of the Oxfordshire County Coun cil, just as much as the ac tiv i ties of the Min is try of Health and Par lia ment, give rise to the emer gence of law. Le gal ity, in this sit u a tion, is to be found within and among the web of in ter ac tions of diverse institutions, and is therefore not reducible to the activities of any particular institution.
This re-ex pla na tion seems es pe cially plau si ble when advanced be yond the state of af fairs de scribed by Hart in 1961. Space lim its us to tak ing up just one of the va ri et ies of prima fa cie le gal phe nom ena we set out in sec tion 1 to un set tle the of fi cial-based ap proach. Let us con sider the exam ple of the Green land Con ser va tion Agree ment. The agree ment, whose cen tral ob ject is a con tent-in de pend ent pe remp tory norm pro hib it ing com mer cial salmon fish ing in Green land's ter ri to rial wa ters, was signed and is prac ticed by three non-gov ern men tal or ga ni za tions on the rec om menda tion of a sci en tific coun cil. The con nec tion of the agreement to any state rec og ni tion or sys temic au tho ri za tion is ten u ous at best, as it has only been rec og nized by the devolved gov ern ment of Green land which has agreed to "help en force it". On the stan dard an a lyt i cal pic ture, then, the agree ment lacks le gal ity, since it lacks of fi cial rec og ni tion by state au thor i ties whose prac tices cre ate the core and bor ders of le gal sys tems. As we sug gested in our ini tial diag no sis, such an ac count seems to un der-em pha size the na ture of the agree ment: sev eral in sti tu tions have deliberately created and now enforce a content-independent peremptory norm governing the use of natural resources.
Given the pos si bil ity of trans-state in sti tu tional nor mative prac tices which are not ad e quately ex plained by state-cen tred le gal the o ries, one might be tempted by the le gal plu ral ist sug ges tion: if one wants to achieve a truly gen eral ju ris pru dence one must rec og nize that (i) law can ex ist in sev eral dif fer ent forms, and (ii) no sin gle form ought to be given ex plan a tory pri or ity. We are now in a po si tion to see why the plu ral ist sug ges tion can be re jected: if le gal ity, both within states and be yond them, is inter-in sti tu tion ally cre ated, and not re duc ible to the ac tiv i ties of a hi er ar chy of state au thor i ties, we can see that trans na tional or even inter na tional le gal ity, con tra the socio-le gal the o rists, is not fun da men tally dif fer ent in kind from mu nic i pal le gal ity, which dif fers in fo cal con tent only. Where le gal ity ex ists, it ex ists be cause it is con sti tuted by inter-in sti tu tional in terac tion which cov ers spe cial ground in a spe cial way. In all of this we have sug gested that the no tion of sys tem might be re tained for law-states, in rec og ni tion of their fo cus on ac tiv i ties core to en dur ing hu man so cial life. We rec og nize, how ever, that re ten tion of the ti tle of "sys tem" is largely a nod to con ven tion, fa mil iar ity, and the par tic u lar prom inence of the law-state in the web of norms in which we all live. Le gal ity is sep a ra ble from the state, both con cep tu ally, and un for tu nately, em pir i cally, as what are lately called 'failed' or 'rogue' states fulfill the conditions of statehood on the back of a fear-based rule which lacks the attributes of legality and systemic legality.
CONCLUSION
Any one ad vis ing adop tion of a novel ap proach to le gal ity and le gal sys tem faces a stiff chal lenge. The pres ently dom inant the o ries are typ i cally dom i nant for good rea son, and chal leng ers must have still better rea sons to ad vo cate change. The inter-in sti tu tional the ory we pres ent ar rives on the back of ar gu ment iden ti fy ing what we be lieve are in super a ble cir cu lar ity and de ter mi nacy prob lems at the founda tion of the of fi cial-based an a lyt i cal ap proach to le gal system. Our inter-in sti tu tional ac count rebalances the analytical ap proach by pro vid ing a sys tem-level ex plan a tory coun ter part to the per sua sive norm-level ac count of le gal ity al ready of fered by an a lyt i cal le gal the o rists. Per haps most im por tantly, we have at tempted to bring our the ory to bear on emerg ing so cial phe nom ena which an a lyt i cal le gal the ories must en coun ter but have not yet en gaged thor oughly. Our the ory is, as we claimed at the out set, still in a ru dimen tary phase, yet all theories must have a beginning, and the inter-institutional theory now has its beginning. 
